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Abstract 
While there is an increasing body of work on social perceptions of people who make moral 
decisions, there is limited work on how feelings of trust affect moral dilemma judgements.  This 
exploratory study sought to examine how hypothetical third-party observers affect moral 
dilemma judgments and perceptions of forgiveness, punishment, and personality traits. A total of 
335 participants read a variation of the “car crash” dilemma (Conway et al., 2013), either alone 
or in the hypothetical presence of a stranger or trusted friend. Individuals were asked to give 
ratings on various dimension scales from either their own perspective, or from the perception of 
the stranger or friend who hypothetically observed their dilemma judgement. While participants 
who completed the survey alone or in the theoretical presence of a friend largely produced 
results consistent with the literature in this field, those who were in the hypothetical presence of 
a stranger performed contrary to past findings. Reasons for these findings and possible future 
directions will be discussed.  
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Introduction 
The trolley dilemma is a widely recognized and commonly used moral dilemma. In this 
narrative, a runaway trolley is barreling towards five individuals who are tied to the train tracks 
and the protagonist must choose between allowing the train to continue its deadly course or pull 
a lever and divert the train to a path only occupied by one innocent person (Foot 1967). While 
this story has gained relevancy in popular culture and entertainment, most individuals are 
unfamiliar with the theories that underlie these sacrificial moral dilemmas. The narrative 
mentioned above is referred to as a high-conflict moral dilemma. A conflict in which either 
option a person decides will directly or indirectly kill another individual. This popular moral 
dilemma has also received numerous modifications, one of which has produced interesting 
counter results. In this modification, the protagonist is standing atop of a bridge and is observing 
an oncoming train that is quickly traveling on a path towards five incapacitated victims (Singer, 
2005). The protagonist is positioned directly above the train’s path and can stop the train by 
dropping a heavy object from above. Coincidently, a large man is standing next to the 
protagonist and is just the right size to stop the train in its tracks. The judgment then remans, is it 
appropriate to push the obese man over the bridge, in order to save the remaining five? Results 
suggested that while most individuals approved of pulling the lever and sacrificing the one 
individual, most participants disapproved of pushing the man over the bridge. The reason for 
these contradictory results may reside in what is referred to as the “doctrine of double effect” 
(Foot 1967). In the latter moral dilemma, the protagonist intends for the obese man to die, 
whereas the protagonist from the former dilemma is left without a choice. The doctrine of double 
effect explains that any action that leads to negative side effects may be ethically carried out, 
provided the intent is not harmful. In contrast, any action that originates from harmful intent, 
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even if its leads to good outcomes, is morally wrong. These two dilemmas illustrate the 
complexity of moral dilemma frameworks and the complex processes that underlie subsequent 
judgements.  
 Most of the research examining moral dilemmas has focused almost exclusively on how 
the deontological and utilitarian theories help to provide a framework for conceptualizing moral 
judgements. According to the dual-process model, those who make deontological decisions rely 
more heavily on affective processes and are primarily concerned with rejecting harm (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on 
its intrinsic nature, in which harming others is always wrong, regardless of its consequences. In 
contrast, utilitarian decision makers rely exclusively on cognitive processes and will accept harm 
that leads to the greatest well-being of others. As such, the principle of utilitarianism states that 
an action is determined by its consequences. In sum, deontology focuses only on the morality of 
any action, whereas utilitarianism focuses on actions that produce the greatest amount of good 
for the largest amount of people. A deontological decision will reflect any option that does not 
inflict direct harm, even if this leads to indirectly harming a greater number of individuals. A 
utilitarian decision will inflict direct harm, but their actions will lead to a greater reduction in 
overall suffering.  
Researchers have extended the research to explore how moral dilemma judgements affect 
social outcomes (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017). Specifically, research suggests that people 
infer the affective and cognitive roles that underlie moral dilemma judgements, which can 
influence their perceptions of the decision maker such as warmth and competence. Warmth 
traits, such as warm, good-natured, and tolerant, were suggested to be more indicative of a 
person’s negative or positive intentions (Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). While competence 
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traits, such as independent, confident, and competitive, revealed more about a person’s capability 
to carry out those intentions. Individuals who make decisions in line with utilitarian philosophy 
and choose to accept harm are generally viewed as less warm but more competent than those 
who make decisions in line with deontology philosophy (Rom et al., 2017). As such, those who 
make utilitarian judgements are often viewed more negatively than those who make 
deontological decisions.  
Historically, because utilitarian judgements are characterized by accepting harm to 
maximize outcomes, those who made these types of decisions were associated with low 
empathetic concern (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012).  However, recent 
developments in this field of research have moved away from the previous notion that those who 
make utilitarian judgements possess antisocial tendencies and have started to provide alternative 
explanations to this popularized conceptual framework. Researchers posit that utilitarian moral 
judgments are not reflective of a utilitarian outlook because of the lack of essential principle 
features (Kahane, 2015). That is, when individuals make utilitarian decisions, they are not 
weighing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but rather engaging in a more meaningful 
process of weighing contrasting moral motives. Therefore, utilitarian decisions are not 
exclusively ruled by cost-benefit analysis, but rather driven by a moral need to make a judgement 
that saves the greatest number people; a drive that is now referred to as the “duty of rescue.” In 
accordance with this new qualitative evidence, researchers have also begun to further analyze 
other external features that impact emotions and subsequent moral dilemma judgements.   
A limited amount of research has begun to analyze how feelings of social connection 
impact moral decision making (Lucas & Livingston, 2014). The presence of others is suggested 
to trigger reputational concerns and a desire to act in a way that will be viewed positively. 
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Individuals who made moral dilemma decisions while feeling socially connected made 
significantly more utilitarian choices. The researchers suspected that when an individual is 
making the decision in the presence of someone they trust, the decision maker feels safer to 
decide without fear of being judged negatively. In contrast, those who made moral dilemma 
decisions under social observation, but lacked social connection, made significantly more 
deontological decisions, as compared to a control group that involved making the decision in 
private. It was hypothesized that these individuals were concerned that a utilitarian judgement 
may lead them to appear psychopathic, so they chose the decision which made them seem more 
prosocial (Lee, Sul, & Kim, 2018).  
The concept that social observation increases prosocial behavior was further supported 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Specifically, researchers sought to 
measure how participants’ ethical consumption would be affected by social observation of a 
stranger (Jung, Sul, Lee, & Kim, 2018). Their findings suggested an observer effect, in which 
participants were more likely to display prosocial behaviors and purchase social products when 
they were being observed. The fMRI data revealed that during social observation, the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) encoded subject-specific 
value parameters during social and non-social purchases. In addition, the ACC showed a strong 
functional coupling with the amygdala and the anterior insula, during times in which the 
participants were purchasing social versus non-social products. Last, regardless of social 
observation, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activity predicted faster reaction time 
and increased prosocial behavior during times of social purchasing, as compared to non-social 
purchasing. In sum, this research provided support for the concept that the brain makes use of 
anatomically and functionally separate neural systems when making prosocial decisions, as 
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mediated by observation. While this imaging study revealed the neurological changes involved 
in third-party observation, the following psychological experiments will help to provide some 
psychological explanations.  
While there is an increasing body of work on social perceptions of people who make 
moral decisions, there is very limited work on judgments of forgiveness and punishment of these 
decision makers. Although research on moral dilemma decisions have been hypothetical in 
nature, people’s perceptions of forgiveness and punishment can have important implications for 
self-perceptions or social interactions. Cheung, Conway, Wright, & Lashkari-Moghaddam (in 
preparation) conducted one of the first set of studies to examine this idea. For example, in one 
study, participants were asked to read the “crying baby” dilemma, which involves choosing 
whether it is appropriate to smother a crying baby in order to prevent a group of townspeople 
from being killed by enemy soldiers (accept outcome-maximizing harm) or to let the baby cry 
risking the death of the townspeople (reject outcome-maximizing harm). Participants were either 
asked to read about a stranger’s decision in response to the dilemma or to make their own 
decision. Following their decision, participants rated to what extent they would forgive or punish 
Brad or themselves. Regardless of the decisions that were made, participants tended to be less 
forgiving of and reported harsher punishment for themselves than the stranger. Therefore, 
individuals seem to be harder on themselves than a stranger. In the present study, this work is 
extended by examining people’s concerns about being forgiven or punished by third-parties 
rather than looking at how much they should be forgiven or punished following a moral dilemma 
decision.  
The present research examines how feelings of social trust impact reputational concerns 
related to moral decision making. This study examined how level of social connection (trusted 
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friend vs. stranger vs. self) and dilemma decision (harm acceptance vs. harm rejection) influence 
participants’ self-reported ratings on concerns about forgiveness, punishment, and personality 
traits. Participants in all three social connection conditions were asked to read a modified version 
of the “car crash dilemma” (Conway et al., 2013). The participants were then asked whether they 
would make a judgement that accepted or rejected outcome-maximizing harm. Following this, 
they were asked to provide self-reported ratings on punishment, forgiveness, as well as warmth, 
competence and morality.  
In addition, this study also measured the extent to which participants forgive or punish 
themselves in the stranger or friend-condition. There is no prior research to predict the outcome 
of this measure. However, because individuals who feel socially connected generally report less 
reputational concerns, it is possible that those in the friend condition might expect their friend to 
be more forgiving and less punishing than that of a stranger. In contrast, the stranger who they 
might interpret as more judgmental, may be perceived as more punishing and less forgiving.  
It was predicted that those who made their moral dilemma judgements in the hypothetical 
presence of a trusted friend would make a decision that is more similar to how one would act 
when they were alone. For those who made their judgment in a stranger condition, it was 
expected that they would be more inclined to pick a deontological than a utilitarian decision 
because of reputational concerns. The study also measured warmth and competence ratings. It is 
expected that those in the alone condition would replicate past findings and rate themselves high 
on both warmth and competence (Lee et al., 2018). Due to the gap in the literature, it was unclear 
how participants would predict a third party would rate them on warmth and competence ratings. 
It was hypothesized that because one shared a positive relationship with a friend, the participants 
may predict a friend would rate them favorably on warmth and competence. This said, because 
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no relationship exists with the stranger, their predictions for how stranger would rate them on 
warmth and competence may be lower than those in the friend condition. The   
Method 
Open Science 
 All hypotheses, study materials, and data analysis plan can be found at 
https://osf.io/hd2jr/.  
Participants  
 Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online 
crowdsourcing platform via TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). It was required 
that participants were 18 years or older, resided in either Canada or the United states, and had an 
approval rating of 95% or above. Based on a power analysis using G*Power (version 3.1.9.2; 
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), a sample size of 400 will be needed to obtain .95 
power assuming a medium effect size (ƒ = .25). 
 A total of 408 MTurk workers were deemed eligible for participation. Of this total, 2 
participants were eliminated because of incomplete responses and an additional 71 were 
eliminated due to failing the manipulation check (7 from the friend condition, 27 from the 
stranger condition, and 37 from the alone condition). The manipulation check required 
participants to correctly select whether they had been alone during the car crash dilemma, or 
accompanied by a friend or stranger. The final sample consisted of 335 participants (186 males 
and 149 females), whose ages ranged from 19 to 70 years of age (M = 35.29, SD = 10.04). The 
ethnic background of the participants were predominantly White (80.30%), followed by Black 
(10.45%), and Latin American (3.58%). Due to the various eliminations, 126 participants (99 
harm accepting and 27 harm rejecting) were included in the friend condition, 106 (71 harm-
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accepting, 35 harm rejecting) participants completed the stranger condition, and 103 (27 harm 
accepting, 76 harm rejecting) made up the alone condition.  
Materials and Procedures 
 MTurk workers were asked to complete a five-minute online survey about decision 
making in different contexts and were compensated 0.50 USD for their participation. Participants 
were first asked to provide demographic information, including age, gender, and ethnicity. 
Following this, participants were randomly assigned to either the trusted friend, stranger, or 
alone condition. Those who would be in the presence of a friend were given the additional step 
of providing the initials of a trusted friend that would later be piped into the car crash dilemma 
(Conway et al., 2013). The dilemma read:  
 
Imagine the following difficult situation:  
You are an Uber driver who is making your way down a busy city street with [a 
stranger/trusted friend’s initials/left blank in the alone condition] in the adjacent seat. 
Suddenly, a young mother carrying a child trips and falls into the path of your vehicle. You 
are going too fast to break in time; your only hope is to swerve out of the way. 
Unfortunately, the only place you can swerve is currently occupied by a little old lady. If 
you swerve to avoid the young mother and baby, you will seriously injure or kill the old 
lady. Is it appropriate to swerve and hit the old lady in order to avoid the young mother and 
child? 
 
Participants were then presented with the following options “Yes, it is appropriate” or 
“No, it is not appropriate”. Following their decision to accept harm or reject harm, participants 
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were presented forgiveness and punishment scales. The parties differed depending on who they 
imagined was rating them on the various scales. For instance, those who were in the presence of 
a stranger were instructed to “In the next few moments, think about how the stranger would react 
to your decision”. Following this, they were asked to imagine “To what extent the stranger 
[would/should] forgive you” and “To what extent the stranger [would/should] punish you”. Due 
to the would and should variations being highly correlated, the ratings were averaged for the 
forgiveness (Cronbach’s α =.62) and punishment scales (Cronbach’s α =.70 ).  
Next, the participants rated themselves, or imagined how a stranger or friend would rate 
them on five competence (competent, confident, independent, competitive, intelligent) and four 
warmth traits (tolerant, warm, good natured, sincere) and one morality trait (moral). A mean 
was computed for the competence traits (Cronbach’s α = .82) and the four warmth traits 
(Cronbach’s α = .89). Ratings were gathered using 7-point Likert scales which were anchored at 
1 (not at all) and 7 (very much).  
Finally, individuals were presented a manipulation check that asked participants to 
answer who was sitting adjacent to them in the car dilemma. For example, those who were in the 
presence of friend, would have to correctly select that a friend had been sitting adjacent to them 
in the car in order to pass the check and have their data be included in the final analysis. 
Following this, participants were informed that their completion code would be provided 
following the debriefing letter and the MTurk code would ensure compensation for their time.  
Results 
Dilemma Decisions 
A Chi-Square Test of Independencewas conducted, which produced a nonsignificant 
relationship between third-party condition and dilemma decision type, χ² (2, N = 335) = 3.97, p > 
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.05, Cramer’s V = .11. Of the 103 members of the alone condition, 74% (n = 76) participants 
chose the harm accepting option, and 26% (n = 27) individuals selected the harm-rejecting 
choice. Of the 126 participants placed in the friend-condition, 79% (n = 99) chose the harm-
accepting option and 21% (n = 27) chose the harm-rejecting option. Finally, of the 106 members 
of the stranger-condition, 67% (n = 71) individuals chose the harm-accepting option and 33% (n 
= 35) participants chose the harm-rejecting option.1 
Forgiveness, Punishment, and Trait Ratings 
Zero-order correlations showed that forgiveness was positively correlated with warmth, 
competence, and morality, but negatively correlated with punishment. The variable of warmth 
was also positively correlated with competence and morality, while also being negatively 
correlated with punishment. Competence was also positively correlated with all other variables. 
Finally, morality was positively correlated with all variables except for punishment, of which it 
was negatively correlated. See Table 1.  
All ratings were subject to a 2 (decision: harm-acceptance vs. harm-rejection) x 3 (party: 
stranger vs. friend vs. self) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). For each rating or 
dependent variable, there are 9 possible pairwise comparisons, such that there are 3 possible 
comparisons for the party main effect and 6 possible comparison for the decision by party 
interaction. Therefore, to control for Type I error, the criteria for statistical significance was 
corrected by dividing α = .05 by the number of possible pairwise comparisons for each rating 
(.05/9 = .006). Therefore the p-value used was set at p < .006 rather than p < .05 for any post-hoc 
pairwise comparison.  
  
                                                 
1 Our analysis plan proposed a logistic regression, but for simplicity, a Chi-square analysis was conducted instead.  
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Table 1  
 
Correlations Between Forgiveness, Punishment, Warmth, Competence and Morality Ratings  
 
 
Measure                1          2          3         4         5        
 
1. Forgive                   .62 
       
2. Punish                   -.60**                  .70 
3. Warmth                 .30**                 -.18**                 .89 
4. Competence          .33**                  0.17**               .71**                 .82 
5. Moral                    .29**                   -.21**               .77**                 .68**               - 
 
Notes. Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities are reported in italics in the diagonal for each variable; N = 
335. ** p < .01 
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Forgiveness. For forgiveness ratings, there was a significant main effect for party, F(2, 
329) = 39.74, p < .001, ηp2  = .195. Post-hoc comparisons for party suggest that participants were 
least forgiving of themselves when they were alone (M  = 3.98, SD = 1.58) than in the presence 
of a stranger (M  = 4.62, SD = 1.64), p = .001, or a friend (M  = 5.86 , SD = 1.15), p < .001. 
Further, forgiveness ratings differed between the latter two conditions, p < .001. There was no 
main effect for decision, in which forgiveness ratings did not differ between harm accepting (M 
= 4.99, SD = 1.66) or harm rejecting (M  = 4.61, SD = 1.63) decisions, F(1, 329) =  
2.14, p = .144, ηp2  = .006. There was also no decision by party interaction effect, F(2, 329) = 
.53, p = .590, ηp2  = .003. 
Punishment. For punishment ratings, there was a significant main effect for party, F(2, 
329) = 13.84, p < .001, ηp2  = .078. Post-hoc comparisons suggested that participants believed a 
friend (M  = 2.08, SD = 1.46) would be less punishing than a stranger (M  = 2.58, SD = 1.59), p < 
.001, or themselves (M  = 3.38, SD = 1.73), p = .006. Further, punishment ratings did not differ 
between the latter two conditions, p = .008. There was no main effect for decision, in which 
forgiveness ratings did not differ between harm accepting (M  = 2.60, SD = 1.63) or harm 
rejecting (M  = 2.75, SD = 1.78) decisions, F(2, 329) = .15, p = .70, ηp2  = 001. There was no 
decision by party interaction effect, F(2, 329) = 13.84, p = .13, ηp2  = .012.  
 Warmth. In regards to warmth ratings, results again suggested a main effect for party, 
F(2, 329) = 61.19, p < .001, ηp2  = .271. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that those in the stranger 
condition (M  = 4.05, SD = .1.34), rated themselves as warmer than those in the alone condition 
(M  = 5.42, SD = 1.02), p < .001, and the friend condition (M  = 5.76, SD = .95), p < .001. 
Further, warmth ratings did not differ between the latter two conditions, p =.455. There was no 
main effect for decision, in which warmth ratings did not differ between harm-accepting (M  = 
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5.16, SD = 1.22) and harm-rejecting, (M  = 5.00, SD = 1.60), decisions, F(2, 329) = .05, p = .82, 
ηp2  = .001. There was no decision by party interaction effect, F(2, 329) = 3.00, p =.05, ηp2  = 
.018. 
Competence. For competence ratings, there was a significant main effect for party, F(2, 
329) = 37.09, p < .001, ηp2  = .184. Post-hoc comparisons for party suggest that participants 
believed a stranger (M  = 4.26, SD = 1.16) would rate them as less competent, than a friend (M  = 
5.53, SD = .94), p < .001, or when they were alone, (M  = 5.24, SD = .94), p < .001. Further, 
competence ratings did not differ between the latter two conditions, p = .275. There was no main 
effect for decision, in which competence ratings did not differ between harm-accepting (M  = 
5.07, SD = 1.07) or harm-rejecting (M  = 4.94, SD = 1.35) decisions, F(1, 329) = .005, p = .95, 
ηp2  = .001. There was also no decision by party interaction effect, F(2, 329) = 1.15, p = .32, ηp2  
= .007.  
 Morality. For morality ratings, results suggested a main effect for party, F(2, 329) = 
44.92, p < .001, ηp2  = .215. Post-hoc comparisons suggested participants believed a stranger (M  
= 4.22, SD = 1.63) would rate them as less moral than a friend (M  = 5.83, SD = 1.13), p < .001, 
or themselves (M  = 5.51, SD = 1.23), p < .001. Further, morality ratings did not differ between 
the latter two conditions, p = .458. There was no main effect for decision, in which morality 
ratings did not differ between harm-accepting (M  = 5.23, SD = 1.43) and harm-rejecting (M  = 
5.19, SD = 1.69), F(2, 329) = .91, p = .341, ηp2  = .003. There was, however, a significant 
decision by party interaction, F(2, 329) = 3.90, p = .021, ηp2  = .023. Specifically, for harm-
rejection, participants’ believed that a stranger would see them as less moral than a friend, p < 
.001, or when they were alone, p < .001, but no differences in morality perceptions between 
judgements from a friend and their own, p = .608. For harm acceptance, participants’ believed 
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that the friend would perceive them as more moral than themselves, p = .015, and more moral 
than a stranger, p < .001. Finally self-judgments were more moral than those expected from 
strangers, p < .001 (see Figure 1).  
Discussion  
Initially, it was expected that those who were in the presence of a stranger would be more 
inclined to make a decision that rejects outcome-maximizing harm. However, results revealed 
that these individuals were actually significantly more likely to accept outcome-maximizing 
harm. This finding was in direct contrast to past research which posited that the presence of a 
stranger would lead to a catalytic effect in which feelings of judgement would trigger 
reputational concerns (Lee et al., 2018). Thus, it was expected that the participants of this study 
would be more likely to make a harm rejecting decision, so to appear more prosocial (Lee et al., 
2018). However, it should be noted that while the Car Crash dilemma has produced reliable 
results, the high amount of utilitarian decisions may imply that participants found it easier to 
murder the old woman, as opposed to the young child (Conway et al., 2013). Therefore, a future 
amendment to this study could involve replacing the old woman with someone who is younger, 
thereby making the dilemma more difficult.  
While it was thought that this may lead those who were in the presence of a stranger to 
report the lowest forgiveness and highest punishment ratings, this prediction was unsupported. 
Rather, participants who completed the survey alone reported the lowest forgiveness scores. This 
finding is contradictory to Lee et al.’s (2018) research which posited that those who complete the 
survey alone should rate themselves high on warmth and competence, and instead supports 
Cheung et al.’s (in preparation) results that individuals appear to be more critical of themselves 
than third-parties. Interestingly, those who were in the presence of a friend reported the highest  
15 
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Figure 1. Morality ratings as a function of decision type and party. 
Utilitarian  
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forgiveness and lowest punishment scores. This provides support for the notion that one would 
expect a friend to be more merciful and less penalizing than a stranger, and possibly even oneself. 
This was based on the finding that those who completed dilemma surveys alone  
generally report high warmth ratings (Lee at al., 2018). Similarly, it was predicted that one would 
expect a friend, someone whom you maintain a close relationship with, to rate you positively on a 
warmth measure. Therefore, those who were in the presence of a stranger reporting the highest 
warmth ratings, was unexpected.   
 For competence ratings, those who were in the presence of a stranger reported 
significantly lower competence scores, as compared to the other conditions. This finding is 
logical when one considers the connection between competence and warmth scores. In the 
literature, it is well-established that when one is rated high on competence measures, they are 
generally rated low on warmth and vice versa (Rom et al., 2017). The aspect that is of interest is 
that most individuals who were in the presence of a stranger chose a harm accepting, or utilitarian 
judgment. Within the literature of moral dilemmas, it is generally deontological decisions that are 
rated as being warmer but less competent, and vice versa for the utilitarian decisions (Koenigs et 
al., 2012).  This is due to deontological decisions involving sparing more lives (i.e., warmer) but 
ultimately leading to more deaths (i.e., less competent) and conversely for utilitarian decisions.  
Therefore, it is interesting that those in the stranger condition reported a pattern that is oppositely 
seen for utilitarian decisions.  
In regards to the morality ratings, those in the presence of a stranger once again reported 
significantly lower scores than the other two conditions. However, a decision by party interaction 
emerged. The interaction indicated that those in the stranger condition rated a harm accepting 
decision as more moral than a harm rejecting decision. In accordance with the dual-process 
model, making a harm rejecting decision can be categorized as a deontologist decision, whereas 
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making a harm accepting decision can be characterized as a utilitarian decision (Rom et al., 
2017). This said, it should be noted that although an individual may make a harm accepting 
decision, that does not infer that the person is a utilitarian. Rather, that person made a decision for 
the particular dilemma that was in line with the utilitarian philosophy (Kahane, 2015). 
With respect to past research, utilitarian decisions were generally viewed as less moral 
than deontological decisions because of their harm accepting nature (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & 
Newman, 2012).  Therefore, those in the presence of a stranger reporting a harm accepting 
decision as more moral, may exemplify the “duty to rescue” drive (Kahane, 2015). In essence, it 
is possible that participants are engaging in a cost-benefit analysis and are driven to make a 
decision that saves the greatest number of lives. This may explain why the utilitarian decision to 
purposely murder an older woman was viewed as more moral than passively allowing the car to 
continue its dangerous course. Hence, despite choosing to murder an innocent victim, this action 
allowed for the greatest number of survivors and least number of casualties. Therefore, 
individuals may predict that an action which has the greatest outcome, will be perceived as most 
moral.  
In regards to the morality ratings, those who completed the survey alone produced much 
larger errors bars than the other two conditions. It can be speculated that this may be the result of 
environmental factors, such that participants may not have completed the survey alone. A key 
aspect of the alone condition was that the participants completed the survey without the presence 
of third-party members. However, because the experiment was completed online, it cannot be 
verified whether this aspect of the experiment was controlled. While it was mentioned at the 
beginning of the survey that all MTurk workers should complete the survey in a quiet 
environment that was free from noise and distraction, it is impossible to verify whether this 
instruction was carried out. A future amendment to this research could involve including a 
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manipulation check at the end of the study that asks participants whether they were alone while 
they completed the survey. This could provide some additional information regarding whether 
different environmental contexts contributed to the variance among those who completed the 
survey alone. It is promising that those who completed the survey in the presence of a friend 
produced the lowest error bars and lowest discrepancy amongst the conditions. It is suspected 
that because those who completed the survey in the hypothetical presence of a friend had a 
similar imagined prototypical individual, this resulting in less variance amongst the condition. 
Such that those who completed the survey in the presence of a friend were more similar to one 
another.  
As well, while this study was largely based on Lee et al.’s (2018) research, there exists 
many methodological differences that may account for the disparity in results For instance, while 
past research used in-person observers, this experiment made use of hypothetical third-parties. 
Thus, perhaps there exists a difference in the way participants view a hypothetical vs. a real 
observer’s judgements. While the current research determined participants were more inclined to 
make utilitarian decisions, Lee et al.’s (2018) work posited different results. They determined that 
participants who were under third-party observation were more inclined to make deontological 
decisions, because of reputational concerns. In turn, these concerns would lead these individuals 
to make less harm accepting decisions, for fear of appearing psychopathic. One explanation for 
the variation in results may reside in the fact that a hypothetical person’s judgements are not 
consequential. That is, participants may only feel reputational concerns when the person who is 
judging them can do actual harm to their reputation (Izuma, 2012). Thus, perhaps participants 
who were under third-party observation did not report more deontological judgements because 
they were not fully influenced by the observer’s hypothetical presence.  
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Due to the brevity of research on how social observation effects warmth and competence ratings, 
this study provides interesting information regarding the parameters of social influence.  
Interestingly, this lack of reputational concerns may also explain why those in the 
presence of a stranger unexpectedly rated themselves as warmer than the other two conditions. 
Based on the work of Lee et al. (2018), it was suggested that social observation increases the 
proclivity of making deontological decisions because of fear of being perceived as cold. Thus, 
deontological decisions can be thought of as an act of self-preservation of warmth. However, 
results suggest that participants predicted the stranger would rate their utilitarian decision as 
fairly warm. Therefore, the lack of concern that one will be perceived as cold, compounded with 
the hypothetical observer reducing reputational concerns, may have impacted warmth ratings.  
Like all moral dilemma research, this study does suffer from methodological limitations. 
One of the greatest limitations of studying moral dilemma judgements is using unrealistic 
dilemmas to infer how people would really behave in morally ambiguous situations. Much like 
the larger field of psychology, there exists a trade off between control and realism. For instance, 
this research used an online survey to introduce a situation and asked participants which dilemma 
choice they would prefer. This experimental design provides great control, and provides high 
reliability that the survey is measuring what the experimenter is attempting to capture from the 
proposed population. In this case, how moral dilemmas are influenced by feelings of trust. 
However, because this experiment is so controlled, it remains speculative whether the results are 
representative of how these same participants would behave in a real life moral dilemma. This 
was largely the reason why the Car Crash dilemma was chosen as the moral dilemma situation. 
The dilemma, which has produced highly reliable results, is more realistic because it represents a 
situation that could potentially occur (Conway et al., 2013). Unlike the more traditionally used 
“Trolley Dilemma”, this dilemma involved a more modern context which participants could 
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better imagine encountering (Foot 1967). The issue of control and realism has resulted in this 
topic of study beginning to researching more realistic moral dilemmas and comparing their 
results with those produced by more traditional and popular dilemmas. Thus, while the Car Crash 
dilemma was determined to be one of the most realistic and reliable dilemma during the time of 
this paper, it cannot be ignored that this experiment may have sacrificed realism for a more 
controlled experimental design.  
Further, recently published work by Bostyn, Sevenhant, and Roets (2018) have further 
examined whether hypothetical dilemmas are representative of real life decisions and have 
produced fairly fascinating results. In their study, participants were asked to make a real-life 
decision to administer an electroshock (they were not aware was fake) to either a single mouse, or 
five additional mice. Their results suggested that while responses to hypothetical dilemmas may 
not be predictive of real-life dilemma behavior, they are predictive of affective and cognitive 
aspects of real-life decision making. Therefore, replicating this research in a more realistic 
manner may provide an interesting future avenue of study.  
With this in mind, a future direction could include introducing virtual reality technology 
and replicating the car crash dilemma. This way, participants could actually make a “real-life” 
decision, while still completing the experiment in a controlled and safe environment. Moreover, 
recent advancements in technology may present a further avenue in which researchers can 
examine moral dilemmas in a way that is more representative of how people would actually 
behave in moral ambiguous and often time strapped situations.  
A future amendment to this study could also include incorporating in-person observers to 
the experimental design. Due to suspected lack of reputational concerns on behalf of those in the 
presence of a stranger, it may be valuable to incorporate a real observer who could watch the 
participants as they make their dilemma decision. In this sense, all participants would complete 
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the experiment alone, or in the physical presence of a friend, or stranger. This would likely result 
in more audience effects because an actual person is likely to have more effect on one’s behavior 
than a hypothetical being (Izuma, 2012). As well, having a real individual may also incorporate 
more consequence into the design. For instance, participants may have deduced that moot 
ramifications will occur if a hypothetical person is unhappy with your dilemma choice. Thus, a 
theoretical person will do essentially no damage to one’s self-image and reputation. However, 
introducing an actual person into the dilemma will likely amplify reputational concerns because 
the risk that one is actually being judged will become unavoidable. Due to the gap in the 
literature addressing how individuals predict their moral dilemma judgements are being 
perceived, this could provide a promising future avenue of investigation. 
Overall, forgiveness, punishment, and morality ratings appeared to be influenced by 
perceived social connection, such that making a moral decision in the company of a trusted friend 
led to higher forgiveness and lower punishment ratings compared to being in the company of a 
stranger or being alone. However, being with a friend did not appear to change perceptions of 
warmth and competence of the person making the moral decision, perhaps because the friend was 
only a hypothetical being and could do no damage to their reputation. Thus, it is plausible the 
observed findings were not driven by reputational concerns. While the exploratory nature of this 
experiment leaves many unanswered questions, this research may provide some insight into the 
cognitive and affective roles that underlie moral dilemma decisions. It is recommended that 
future research make use of more realistic and challenging moral dilemmas, as well as using 
more consequential observers.  
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